The origins of the PEACE Programmes

The first PEACE Programme was introduced during 1994. The initial funding provided (€300 million) was increased to €500 million and brought the Programme up to the end of 1999. Since then, the Programmes have evolved and adapted in ways that could never have been envisaged at the time.

In four successive Programmes from 1995 to the end of 2020 almost €2.3 billion has been allocated to fund almost 22,500 projects across the eligible area of Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland^[1] with €1.6 billion coming from the EC and the remaining €0.7 billion from national contributions by the Member States (British and Irish Governments).

PEACE Programme Funding Allocation:

This short paper tracks some of the main features of the evolution of the Programmes in the light of a number of key drivers. These include:

• The evolution of the Peace Process which the Programmes were intended to support
• Changes in the regulatory environment in which the Programmes operate, in particular, the institutional framework provided by the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement, and developments in how EU-funded programmes were managed
• Responses to the evolving needs of the beneficiaries and participants in the Programmes, driving radical changes in approach and in content development.
• Developments and changes in our understanding of what peace-building and conflict resolution meant, and in particular, our understanding of what was required to address deep divisions and promote reconciliation.

The journey embarked on in 1994 with the first PEACE Programme was a pioneering, ground-breaking undertaking that would explore new methods of peace-building and conflict resolution that had never been tried before. Understanding how the programmes have evolved is one of the key legacies that the PEACE Programmes will leave behind to benefit others in situations where similar interventions may be required. It also helps those involved in the programmes to understand better the path that has been travelled to better understand the road that still remains ahead.

PEACE I – Rapid Response Plan and the People’s Peace Process

On the 31^st of August 1994, the IRA announced a ceasefire that was to prove critical to the peace process in Northern Ireland. Their statement included a commitment to a complete cessation of what they called ‘military operations’ and a recognition that ‘a solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations^[2].

According to Lost Lives^[3], 69 people died during 1994 – they were numbered 3,453 to 3,521 in the long list of names of over 3,700 men, women and children who lost their lives during The Troubles. Of those who died in 1994, 52 were civilians (i.e. not members of the security forces or of any of the paramilitary groups engaged in the conflict); 6 were members of the security forces; 8 were loyalist paramilitaries and 3 were republican paramilitaries. Movement towards a ceasefire had begun during that year, but the continuing high level of violence and the lack of certainty meant that the initial announcement was not greeted with any sense of euphoria. The public reaction in Ireland, Northern Ireland and in Great Britain was sceptical.

Seven weeks later, on the 13^th of October 1994, a statement by the Combined Loyalist Military Command (an umbrella group for the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Ulster Defence Association and the Red Hand Commando), said that the command would ''universally cease all operational hostilities as from 12 midnight on Thursday 13^th of October 1994". The statement added that the truce would be linked to the IRA's ceasefire.^[4]

On the 7^th of December of that year, the European Commission issued a Press Release^[5] confirming the adoption of a proposal from its President, Jacques Delors for a Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. An initial 300 million ECU^[6] was allocated for the initial three-year period 1995 to 1997, with additional funding to be allocated subject to a review of progress. The statement contained all of the elements that were to form the essence of the PEACE Programmes that were to follow: Special Programmes; Community Initiative; European Union solidarity with the people of Northern Ireland; Peace Dividend; Promote Reconciliation; Encourage Economic Growth and the Expansion of Job Opportunities. The priorities of the new fund were to include fresh actions to support urban and rural regeneration, to fight unemployment, to encourage increased cross-border development and to promote social inclusion, the latter including actions to stimulate cross-community cooperation. In that one-page press release, all of the seeds of the subsequent PEACE Programmes, from PEACE I to PEACE IV, were included.

The announcement of the PEACE Programmes was the first real tangible evidence of a Peace Dividend for a public that was weary of the violence, deaths and constant fear caused by the conflict. The first role of the PEACE Programmes was, therefore, to generate confidence in the nascent peace process and to build momentum on the ground towards a gradual healing of the wounds of division.

During the next 5 years (1995 to 1999), a total of €500 million from the EU and €167 million co-financing from the British and Irish Governments, would be used to finance over 15,000 projects^[7] directly aimed at addressing the priorities identified in the original EU Press Release. That works out at an average of €45,000 per project. A total of 31,000 applications for funding were received, testament to the level of demand and hunger that existed at the time for help. The distribution of funding was skewed towards the most socially and economically disadvantaged areas – 60% of funding was allocated to designated disadvantaged areas, accounting for 34% of the population. The funding was also used to facilitate the participation of ‘hard-to-reach’ groups such as politically motivated ex-prisoners and victims of violence.

The explicit, underpinning rationale for PEACE I was “the overwhelming need to maintain the momentum for peace”^[8]. It was imperative that evidence of the value of the peace process should be seen in the lives of people living in the region. For that reason, the programme acted as a rapid response initiative that generated a high level of activity within every community in the region. Local authorities and community groups were marshalled to prepare regeneration plans for their areas; new partnership structures were created at local and district levels to ensure inclusiveness and buy-in by a wide spectrum of society. Towns were regenerated; bridges and border crossings were rebuilt and reopened, and the immediate visible legacy of the conflict gradually began to be dismantled. It would take a number of years before the watchtowers and border-crossing checkpoints were removed and the military presence scaled down, but there was evidence that the process had begun. In that sense, the first Peace programme fulfilled the role of a Marshal Plan, similar to the European Recovery Plan put in place in 1948 in the aftermath of World War II. The economy of the region was on its knees and the PEACE Programme provided a stimulus for a gradual rebuilding and regeneration process to take place. The process was eventually to lead to an investment of over €2 billion in subsequent PEACE Programmes.

Of course, it was not all plain sailing. History provides evidence that the Peace Process triggered by the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires of 1994, did not result in an easy path to the complete cessation of hostilities or an immediate and final ending of The Troubles. Neither was the pathway of the PEACE Programmes without difficulties.

The IRA ceasefire was revoked on the 9^th of February 1996^[9]. This was followed by a period of significant violence, with bombs in Manchester (June 1996), London Docklands (February 1996), Enniskillen (July 1996), and a number of high-profile killings of members of the security forces on both sides of the border. The ceasefire was subsequently reinstated on the 19^th of July 1997^[10], in time to facilitate ongoing negotiations that would lead to the signing of the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement on 10^th of April of 1998. Even in the aftermath of the signing of the Agreement, a horrific explosion on a peaceful Saturday afternoon in the town of Omagh on 15^th of August 1998^[11], resulting in the deaths of 29 people, 2 unborn children, and injuring 370 people, registered the largest loss of life of any single incident in the history of The Troubles. Peace at that time seemed a long way away.

During all this time, when ceasefires and talks appeared to break down irrevocably, PEACE I continued to operate. The funding continued to be distributed and the projects continued to be implemented. The Programme also assisted in dealing with the aftermath of traumatic incidents such as the Omagh Bombing^[12]. Cross community groups, community partnerships, local authorities and district partnerships continued to implement the plans that had been approved and agreed. It was in this sense and at that time that the PEACE Programme became ingrained into the life of the people in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland. It was, in effect, a parallel peace process – the peace process of the people. The Programme instilled and developed a resilience and an identity that had been hard-won and that was capable of continuing despite the difficulties being experienced in the broader political peace process.

The Good Friday / Belfast Agreement – Institutional Framework

It was against this backdrop that the EU agreed to a second Peace Programme PEACE II^[13], in recognition of the EU’s continuing support for the peace process in Northern Ireland and the fact that, despite the extraordinary difficulties being faced, the PEACE I Programme continued to function. The decision to proceed with a second programme was taken at the meeting of the European Council in Berlin in March 1999^[14]. The decision was also taken in recognition of the fact that the implementation of the PEACE II Programme would take place in the new political and institutional context that had been created by the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement^[15].

PEACE II was different from PEACE I in two major respects: firstly, the programme was to be implemented in line with the new institutional arrangements agreed under the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement; and, secondly, the programme was now part of the EU Structural Funds family of programmes. Both of these factors had a significant impact on the Programme.

The PEACE II Operational Programme^[16] outlines the implications of the Good Friday Agreement for the PEACE II Programme. The Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) was created as one of the six North South Implementation Bodies created under what is known as Strand 2 of the Agreement, dealing with North South Cooperation, with specific responsibility as the Managing Authority of the new PEACE II Programme; of the INTERREG III Programme; and the administration of the cross-border elements of the other European Community Initiative Programmes on the island of Ireland (LEADER+, EQUAL, and URBAN II). It was also designated as being responsible for monitoring and promoting the implementation of the Common Chapter on North/South Co-operation set out in the National Development Plan for Ireland and in the Northern Ireland Structural Funds Plan. The text of the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement sets out these responsibilities and links them directly to the Programmes that were then in place. Subsequent amendments and agreements between the British and Irish Governments^[17] confirmed that these provisions would be applied to all successor programmes agreed between the European Commission and the two Governments. These arrangements firmly placed the SEUPB and the PEACE Programmes at the heart of the EU presence in Ireland and Northern Ireland and as an integral part of the institutional architecture provided by the Good Friday Agreement. The Programmes were no longer a short-term intervention. They were part and parcel of the wider peace process and of the development of good relations within Northern Ireland (Strand 1), between Northern Ireland and Ireland (Strand 2), and between the two islands of Ireland and Great Britain (Strand 3).

The following diagram^[18] is useful in positioning where the SEUPB and the PEACE Programmes sit in relation to the Institutional Architecture created by the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement:

Strand 1 of the Agreement made provisions for the setting up of democratic institutions in Northern Ireland (the Northern Ireland Assembly; the Northern Ireland Executive; and the Civic Forum). Strand 2, provided for the creation of the North South Ministerial Council (consisting of representatives of the democratic institutions on both sides of the border) and the North South Implementation Bodies (of which there were six, each with responsibility for a specific set of sectoral activities^[19]). Strand 3 included arrangements for cooperation between the democratically elected institutions on the two Islands, on an East-West basis. SEUPB was positioned in Strand 2 and was accountable to the North South Ministerial Council.

The implications of these arrangements for SEUPB and for the management of the PEACE Programmes was that an independent structure was being created, answerable to both administrations, with the authority to carry out the activities required of a Managing Authority of an EU Structural Funds Programme, as set out in the relevant EU Regulations.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of this arrangement. It meant that the SEUPB was in effect a Body set up as part of an international agreement, not under the control of one administration or political entity, with the independence to act in line with agreed protocols set out by the EU and agreed with both Governments, and accountable to both the Irish and British / Northern Ireland Governments. This meant that the SEUPB could act as a totally neutral Body in the administration of the funding for which it was responsible. This was to prove of central importance in the years ahead when disputes arose about impartiality in the distribution of funds and the decision-making process associated with the approval, monitoring, and implementation of projects.

The PEACE Programmes and Structural Funds

The management of EU Structural Funds in Member States during the Programming Period 2000 to 2006 was governed by a suite of Regulations (i.e., legal instruments agreed by all Member States) commonly referred to as the Structural Funds Regulations 2000-2006^[20]. There were 5 funds in the Structural Funds family, each of them covered by a separate regulatory instrument: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the European Social Fund (ESF); the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF); the Finance Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG); and the Cohesion Fund. In addition, the INTERREG Programme, known then as INTERREG III, was set up as a Community Initiative, with its own set of regulatory compliance requirements. PEACE I had been set up as a Community Initiative, similar to INTERREG for the period 1995 to 1999. In the new Programming Period 2000 to 2006 however, this was changed.

The new PEACE Programme was set up as a special mainstream Objective 1 Programme, referred to in the main Regulation Governing the management of Structural Funds, Regulation 1260^[21], as follows: “Under Objective 1, a PEACE programme in support of the peace process in Northern Ireland shall be established for the years 2000 to 2004 for the benefit of Northern Ireland and the border areas of Ireland.”. As such, the new Programme would require its own Operational Programme and a management structure that complied with the provisions of Regulation 1260. The new programme also included within its funding mix elements from each of the 5 Structural Funds (i.e., ERDF, ESF, EAGGF, FIFG and Cohesion). In that sense it was a multi-fund Programme. This brought with it a considerable degree of additional flexibility in terms of what could be funded, but it also entailed a greater level of management and governance complexity.

In addition to the main Structural Funds Regulation (Regulation 1260), and the Regulations governing each of the 5 Funds, there were a number of important Regulations dealing with the implementation of Structural Funds Programmes. These included: Regulations on Management and Control Systems; Regulations on Eligible Expenditure; Regulations regarding the Procedure for making Financial Corrections; Regulations on the use of the Euro; Regulations on the Information and Publicity Actions to be taken by the Member States.

It was within this complex regulatory environment that the newly created SEUPB was the designated Managing Authority, responsible for the PEACE II Programme and for the Community Initiatives involving cross border cooperation. It also had a broader remit related to the monitoring of cross border cooperation areas specified under the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement – these additional responsibilities were referred to as the ‘Common Chapter’, so called because they referred to an agreed set of cross border cooperation initiatives included as a common chapter in both the National Development Plan for Ireland and the Northern Ireland Structural Funds Plan (also referred to as the Community Support Framework – CSF).

The PEACE II Programme was agreed for an initial period of 5 years (2000 to 2004) but was extended for an additional 2 years (2005 to 2006) to bring it into line with the standard EU 7-year Programming Cycle. For the first period, 2000 to 2004, the EU contribution amounted to €531 million, with a national co-financing contribution from the British and Irish Governments of €304 million. This was added to for the second phase – the EU funding was increased by €78 million, and the Member States contributed an additional €82 million. This brought the total funding for the Programme over the 7 years to €995 million. The funding was spread over a total of 7,103 projects.

In 2010, the Northern Ireland Statistics Research Agency (NISRA) carried out an analysis of the achievements of the PEACE II Programme on behalf of the Northern Ireland Executive^[22]. The analysis identified that the Programme had reached a total of 868,420 individual participants. In a region with a population of just over 2 million, this represents a very deep reach into the population. Of these, 161,599 had participated in cross-border activities and 42,772 had participated in what were labelled as ‘Reconciliation Projects’. A total of 1,638 groups were involved in these Reconciliation Projects. In addition, the Programme had assisted 100,767 individuals to gain additional qualifications and 77,652 had entered into or progressed in employment, education, and training. The findings of this analysis can be summarised in the following table:

Emerging Challenges

PEACE II had evolved into a major strategic intervention programme aimed at addressing in a fundamental way the legacy of the conflict and at promoting reconciliation within a society that was still deeply divided. It was a large, complex programme that reached into every aspect of life in the region. As a result, it faced many challenges, and the managers of the Programme were obliged to develop innovative ways of addressing these challenges. Three areas in particular resulted in important developments that would shape the future of peace building in the region and beyond for years to come. These were:

• The Distinctiveness Challenge:

PEACE II needed to separate itself out from a normal regional development programme funded by the EU Structural Funds – it needed to define in what way it was ‘distinctive’. This was a challenge posed by a number of audits and evaluations carried out at the time on behalf of the EU, especially at the conclusion of PEACE I and during the first phase of the PEACE II Programme leading up to 2004. This led to the need to develop an understanding of what was meant by ‘Reconciliation’ and how that concept should be applied to the management of such a large Programme. A separate paper^[23] is available that traces this process. This was to prove to be the most defining moment in the evolution of the PEACE Programmes and would become the heartbeat of all future interventions. It also defined the approach to be adopted in identifying the priorities that the PEACE Programme should be addressing and, in that sense, determined the content of future interventions.

• The Inclusiveness Challenge

It became apparent at the early stage of the development and implementation of the PEACE Programmes that it was essential to ensure that all of the communities in the region were afforded an equal opportunity to participate in the programmes and benefit equally from the funding that was available. The neutrality, impartiality and objectivity of Programme management required evidence to be provided that all sides of the divided community were afforded an opportunity to benefit from the Programme. This challenge led to the development of methods of analysis and planning that became known as ‘Community Uptake’. A separate paper is available that traces the development of the methodology that was to be used in this process and the impact that it had on programme management and implementation^[24]. Social inclusiveness and equality of opportunity to participate is the bedrock on which reconciliation is built and it became a defining element of future programmes.

• The Communications Challenge

Living and working in a deeply divided society, under intense political scrutiny and within very demanding governance and regulatory requirements, made it essential for the Programme to develop a strategy for communication that was capable of meeting all of these challenges. Added to this, EU regulations required the programme to adhere to strict guidelines on communications, information provision and publicity. This became an integral part of the challenge to promote reconciliation and inclusiveness and became another defining element of the Programme and of all future interventions. It also became an integral part of the governance and transparency ethos of the programmes, promoting a culture of comprehensive documenting and disseminating of information on programme activities for public authorities, the media and beneficiaries. A separate paper is available that traces the development of the communications strategy of the Programme and the implications this has for programme development.^[25].

Taken together, these three factors could collectively be defined as the most distinctive features of the PEACE Programmes. The evolution of the programmes and of the application of these distinctive features was also affected by the changes that were taking place in the administrative and political context in which the programmes were delivered.

The introduction of bespoke political and administrative institutions based on mandatory power-sharing arrangements by the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement in 1998, created a unique framework for public service governance in Northern Ireland^[26]. It should not be seen as unusual, given the depth of the divisions that these arrangements were aimed at addressing, that these power-sharing arrangements should have a rocky history since 1999. The evolution of the Northern Ireland and North-South political and administrative arrangements had an important impact on the way in which the PEACE Programmes evolved.

On the 14^th of October 2002, the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland were suspended following on the breakdown in relations between the main political parties^[27]. This began a period of direct rule from Westminster for Northern Ireland, lasting until 26^th March 2007. During this period, the institutions entered into a phase of what was referred to as ‘Care and Maintenance’ with Ministers appointed from the Government in Westminster. During the five years of suspension, the PEACE Programmes continued to operate in close collaboration with civil servants in Belfast, Dublin, and London and with careful oversight from the EU Commission. It was during this period that PEACE II made the transition from a 5-year programme, 2000 to 2004, to a 7-year programme, with an extension for the years 2006 to 2007. The preparation, development, and implementation of the plans for this extension involved a considerable amount of public consultation across all sectors of society in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland. Throughout the period of suspension, the Programme Monitoring Committee, consisting of representatives of all sides of the community, including those political parties that had been part of the Institutions that were now suspended, continued to operate as the key decision-making body for the Programmes. During the 5 years of suspension, it was at these Programme Monitoring Committee meetings that representatives of the political parties and of community partnership groups continued to take decisions about how the funding for the programmes were administered and distributed. They became in fact a key focal point for the maintenance of the peace process and of the dialogue necessary for the maintenance of the peace in the region. That period represented an important moment in the evolution of the Programmes – they reached a maturity in their growth that enabled them to weather the very stormy waters of suspension, while maintaining dialogue and collaboration between divided communities in the furtherance of the aims of the programmes.

During the period of suspension, the British and Irish Governments engaged in a series of consultations and discussions with the representatives of the political parties in Northern Ireland that culminated in meetings held at St. Andrews in Scotland. These discussions culminated in an agreement to restore the institutions in Northern Ireland in line with what has become known as the St. Andrews Agreement^[28].  Following on the reinstatement of the Northern Ireland Executive and the devolved institutions in March 2007, a meeting of the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) took place on 17th July 2007 at which it was agreed that as part of the agreement, a root and branch review of the North-South Implementation Bodies would be undertaken^[29]. A report on the outcome of this review was published on 4^th April 2008^[30]. The Report contained a strong endorsement of the work of the SEUPB and of the PEACE Programmes, noting in particular the success that had been achieved in balancing the distribution of funding from a cross-community perspective. The report stated: “The body has managed to achieve a considerable balance in the distribution of funding from a cross-community perspective… The body’s work to increase the propensity to apply among Protestant communities by conducting roadshows and by working with community representatives is to be commended.”^[31]

The experience of working throughout the 5-year period of suspension of the institutions, and the corporate maturity that this conveyed on the SEUPB and the PEACE Programmes, were to be invaluable when the second major period of suspension of the Institutions occurred in January 2017 and lasted for over 1,000 days until October 2019. This second period of suspension was different from the first in that the British Government did not impose direct rule from Westminster – in effect, it was a period of Government without Ministers^[32]. Once again, the Programme Monitoring Committee of the PEACE Programmes continued to function and the SEUPB carried out its functions in close collaboration with the civil servants in Belfast, Dublin and with the EU Commission in Brussels.

The ability of the Programmes to withstand the political and administrative turmoil and to survive and prosper despite the obstacles that this put in the path of peace building, is a testament to the resilience of the institutions created by the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement and further endorsed by the St. Andrews Agreement.

PEACE Plus Programme

This corporate, community and institutional resilience was again demonstrated on the wake of the referendum on membership of the European Union that took place on 23^rd June 2016^[33], which gave rise to what has since become known as Brexit. The decision by the British electorate to leave the European Union raised the question about the continued relevance of the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement and the Institutional Framework that it created, and of the continued involvement of the EU Commission in the PEACE Programmes.

After an extensive period of negotiation between the British Government and the European Union, the text of EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement^[34] was published on 17th October 2019 and signed by both parties on 20th January 2020. As part of the agreement, a special Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland was included which, among other things, “Avoids a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, and safeguards the all-island economy and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in all its dimensions”^[35] The Protocol includes provisions to allow North South cooperation to continue and develop, recognising that North South cooperation is an integral part of the Good Friday Agreement, and is essential for achieving reconciliation on the island of Ireland. The Protocol provides a legal framework and affirms the commitment of the EU and UK to the development of a PEACE PLUS programme, a successor to the PEACE Programmes, incorporating the work of the INTERREG Programmes^[36]. In December 2019, the SEUPB launched a consultation exercise to prepare the PEACE PLUS Programme which is intended to last for the 7-year period 2021 to 2027^[37]. This will ensure that the legacy of the PEACE Programmes will continue to influence the development of community relations, reconciliation and cross border cooperation in the region in the period immediately following on Britain’s departure from the European Union.

The decision to embark on the development of the PEACE PLUS Programme is perhaps the best testimony to how the PEACE Programmes have evolved since they were first introduced in 1994. They have become an integral part of the fabric of life in the region and provide a key platform for the maintenance and development of the peace process at a community and cross border level. The new Programme is also a statement about the fact that building peace is a long-term process that spans the generations following on from the cessation of violence. The challenge of reconciliation remains and is even more relevant in the post Brexit era.

Conclusion

This paper has traced the evolution of the PEACE Programmes from 1994 to the present day within the political and institutional context created by the cessation of violence and the signing of the Good Friday / Belfast Agreement in 1998. That story is one of adaptation and of resilience, weathering the turmoil and storms that, with the benefit of hindsight, should be considered as not unusual after such a long period of violence and conflict.

The programmes have evolved in many ways. This paper has concentrated on their evolution within the political / legal context of the time with reference also to the way in which the content and management of the Programmes have evolved. The paper is one of a series which includes topics such as Reconciliation; Social Inclusion / Community Uptake; Communication; Working with Ex-Prisoners / Former Combatants; Victims and Survivors of the Conflict; Women in the Peace Programmes; Children and Young People; and the importance of the Local Authorities in the management and development of the Programmes. All of these papers are part of the story of how the Programmes have evolved.

It is sincerely hoped that the lessons learned from the Northern Ireland / Ireland peace process and from the PEACE Programmes in particular will give hope and inspiration to those who have worked so hard to make them work and to those who are engaged in similar work in other regions of the world.

[1] Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan and Sligo.

[2] Retrieved from: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira31894.htm

[3] McKittrick, D. et al (1999 and 2007), Lost Lives, Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, pp. 1343 ff.

[4] BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/13/newsid_4065000/4065897.stm

[5] European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_94_1165

[6] ECU: The European currency unit, abbreviated as ECU, was the former currency unit of the European Communities, from its adoption on 13 March 1979 (replacing the 'European Unit of Account') to its own replacement by the Euro on 1 January 1999, at a ratio of 1:1: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:European_currency_unit_%28ECU%29#:~:text=The%20European%20currency%20unit%2C%20abbreviated,a%20ratio%20of%201%3A1.

[7] Price Waterhouse Coopers (2003), Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I and Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II- Final Report, SEUPB, Belfast.

[8] Ibid, para. 1.19

[9] Retrieved from: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira9296.htm

[10] Retrieved from: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira19797.htm

[11] Retrieved from: http://www.omagharchive.co.uk/Pages/Home.aspx

[12] See for example: Bolton, D. Conflict, Peace and Mental Health – Addressing the Consequences of Conflict and Trauma in Northern Ireland (2017), Manchester University Press

[13] EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland – 2000-2004 – Operational Programme, SEUPB, Belfast.

[14] Presidency Conclusions – Berlin European Council – 24^th and 25^th March 1999, para. 44(b). Retrieved from:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html

[15] EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland – 2000-2004 – Operational Programme, SEUPB, Belfast. para. 1.1

[16] Ibid. para. 1.2

[17] NB – Reference required for amendments and letters of understanding

[18] EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland – 2000-2004 – Operational Programme, SEUPB, Belfast. para. 1.2

[19] The other North South Bodies were: The Food Safety Promotion Board (Safefood); The Trade and Business Development Board (InterTrade Ireland); Waterways Ireland; The Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission (The Loughs Agency); and The North/South Language Body (known in Irish as An Foras Teanga or in Ulster-Scots as Tha Boord o Leid). An additional Body, Tourism Ireland, was added in 1999.

[20] Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/legislation/regulations/2000-2006/

[21] COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds; Article 7, para. 4

[22] Review of PEACE II Programme (2010), NISRA, Belfast

[23] Link to paper on reconciliation

[24 http://peace-platform-external-test.primodi.com/en/story-of-peace/key-themes/community-uptake/

[25] http://peace-platform-external-test.primodi.com/en/story-of-peace/key-themes/communications/

[26] Torrance, D. (2020), Briefing Paper No. CBP 8439, Devolution in Northern Ireland, 1998-2020, House of Commons Library

[27] Retrieved from: http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/about-the-assembly/general-information/history-of-the-assembly/#8

[28] The Northern Ireland, St. Andrews Agreement Act, 2006

[29] See: https://www.northsouthministerialcouncil.org/st-andrews-agreement-review

[30] St. Andrews Agreement Review (2008), Terms of Reference 1 – Report of Experts/Advisers, North South Ministerial Council (NSMC), Armagh.

[31] Ibid. page 4.

[32] Torrance, D. op. cit. pp. 30-32

[33] The Referendum was made possible by the enactment of the European Union Referendum Act, 2015: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/36/contents/enacted

[34] Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12019W/TXT(02)&from=EN

[35] Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/european-union-and-united-kingdom-forging-new-partnership/eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement/protocol-ireland-and-northern-ireland_en

[36] Government of Ireland (September 2020) Preparing for the End of the Transition Period – Brexit Readiness Action Plan, Dublin, pp. 52-53. Retrieved from:

https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/eu/brexit/keydocuments/Brexit-Readiness-Action-Plan.pdf

[37] Preparing the PEACE PLUS Programme – European Territorial Cooperation 2021-2027 – Stakeholder Engagement Information Document, (December 2019), SEUPB, Belfast.